

SECURITY SURVEY & RISK ASSESSMENT

[NAME PREMISES]

UN HOUSE/UN COMMON PREMISES/ UNDP PREMISES

[DUTY STATION] – [COUNTRY]

Date of Survey: [DAY-MONTH-YEAR]

Date of Report: [DAY-MONTH-YEAR]

Report By: [Name UN Security Advisor – UNDSS]

Reference Documents:

1. *Security Risk Assessment for [Duty Station] - Revised [Date]*
2. *Country-Specific MOSS – [Date]*
3. *SMT-Approved Security Plan [Date] (with the related Annexes)*
4. *Field Security Handbook 2006*

EXECUTIVE NOTE

The UN House/UNDP location is at the crossroad of five streets in Duty Station X. Armed police from the government Diplomatic Protection Unit are deployed at the site for external protection on a 24/7 basis. The building is adjacent to the residence of the XYZ Ambassador and the XYZ police station.

Under the current Security Risk Assessment for Duty Station X, the two major threats that have a potential to affect the UN House derive from terrorist bombing (VBIED and PBIED) and from fire. The SRA indicates that the threat of terrorism against the UN in Country X is not specific to the country but “regional” in nature. With the small threat that poses, local extremism has been undergoing positive reform from one side, and depressed by the Government from another. Under this current assessment, the premises are suitable for UN operations providing serious improvement is made.

UNDP has been undertaking a series of actions to improve the state of preparedness of the building. These actions need to continue as the premises still require significant improvement, in terms of physical measures and in procedures. Access control practices are inadequate. The security entrance room is inadequate and needs to be re-designed and re-equipped. A guard force should be hired to enforce the needed access control measures. The building is assessed to have a Medium to High fire risk. UNDP has started to rectify this issue. A fire safety and building evacuation plan with a bomb threat plan need to be written and exercised periodically. Parking in the two side streets near the building perimeter wall needs to be discussed with the authorities.

If in case the UN threat assessment for terrorism in Duty Station X increases, additional measures need to be deployed to meet any possible new level of threat. Taking into account the busy cross-roads where the UN House is located, and the little standoff from both sides of the building, relocation of premises should not be discounted.

A. OFFICE PREMISES

Location and Neighborhood:

The UN House/UNDP is located in the eastern part of the commercial quarters of the city of Duty Station X. It is positioned at a star-shaped busy intersection of XYZ street, ABC street, JKL street and DEF street; less than a kilometer from the down town GHI Square and also from the MNO Sea Port. The land is wall to wall with the residence of the XYZ Ambassador (marked as 1 on Fig.2), which is immediately adjacent to the XYZ police station (marked as 2) both in XYZ street. The building is a standalone four-storey government villa surrounded by all around perimeter wall and tall trees. The UN House is overlooked by XYZ hotel (marked as 3) across the road on XYZ street and also by unfinished commercial building (marked as 4); both are 6-storey high. An empty unused villa (marked as 5) borders the UN House from the east.



FIG.1 – UN-HOUSE GENERAL LOCATION-CITY OF Duty Station X




FIG.2 – UN-HOUSE IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORHOOD

B. CURRENT SITUATION

B.1. GENERAL:

This cement/steel structure was built in the middle of the twenties century, originally as a villa for a high-ranking Official. UN House accommodates UNDP with small presence for other agencies: UNIDO, WFP and UNDSS. The UNDP Res Rep is also the appointed DO and the RC.

Basement: The UNDSS Security Advisor resides in the basement, the UNIDO program office is situated in the southern annex of the building and the WFP liaison office is on the second floor, also the roof. The basement houses UNDSS, the future Crisis Coordination Center, the UNDP IT room and the UNDP/RC archive room. The basement is half sunk in the ground. The basement carries signs of cement deterioration due to dampness. It appears that this deterioration is not sufficient to jeopardize the current strength of the building and ability to withstand physical stresses caused by external forces (earthquakes or bombing). However, an expert opinion would be beneficial.

Ground Floor: This floor houses UNDP Operations and the conference room. It is slightly above the ground. The building main entrance door leads immediately to its main lobby. It has a rear door that accesses the car park to the east. It has two staircases that lead to the first floor and one stairwell

leading to the basement.

First Floor: This floor houses the UNDP program offices, the UN Coordination office, the DRR and the RC/DO/RR.

Second Floor/Roof: This floor has four rooms and a service area. One of the rooms is used as the WFP Liaison Office in Duty Station X, housing one local staff member. The rest of the floor is the open roof area. Car Parking Area: is situated towards the rear of the building with access from the side street (marked as 3 on Fig.3 below).




FIG.3 – No.1. Main Entrance,
No.2. Side Gate (service gate)
No.3. Car Park entrance

(see photos below)

B.2. ENTRY-EXIT POINTS FROM UN-HOUSE:



FIG.4 –Main Entrance (#1 in Fig.3)



FIG.5 –Side Gate (#2 in Fig.3)



FIG.6 Car Parking Gate -in blue- (#3 in Fig.3)

Three locations access UN House from the surrounding streets. The double-sided main gate (fig.4) is accessible from XYZ street. It is used for all purposes: staff, visitors and goods. The sliding side gate (fig.5) is rarely used. On occasions it is used by tradesmen and for large deliveries. The sliding car parking gate (fig.6) is only used in the morning to let the UNDP office cars out and again at the end of the working day for overnight parking. All those gates are made of double-sided steel sheets.

B.3. PERIMETER WALL AND ON-STREET PARKING:

All the streets surrounding the UN-House are one-way traffic (see fig.2). Photos (fig.7, 8 & 9) show the

street perimeter wall and give an indication on the on-street parking around the premises. The parking by the perimeter wall is reserved for the UN staff members. Blue UN-marked signs are placed by the side-walk. However, this parking restriction is not enforced by the traffic police.



FIG.7 –View from XYZ Street




FIG.8 – View from ABC Street



FIG.9 – View From DEF Street

B.4. STANDOFF DISTANCES:



Note: All the quoted numbers in fig.10 are distances from the building external walls to the perimeter wall. Standoff is increased by the surrounding trees with the bollards introduced on the footpath by UNDP. Practically, all quoted distances should be increased by 2meters.

The standoff distance from GHI street is a good 17m to the perimeter wall. Neighbors' standoff ranges

from zero at the northern tip of the land (where the drivers' room is located wall to wall with the XYZ Residence) to 6m; with distances ranging between 3m to 4m in between. The standoff from the two side streets is only 4m to the main building but only 2m where UNCDF is located on the ABC street side of the building.

B.5. FRONT GARDEN: Elevated Ground

The front loan area is an elevated ground ranging from 1.5m to 1.8m above street level. Walking towards UNIDO and UNDSS, one has to take few steps down descending to about 0.5m below street level. This is the floor level of UNIDO and UNDSS. The rest of the basement is approximately 1m below the street level.




FIG.11 –Front Garden left side showing entrance to UNIDO




FIG.12 – Front Garden right side showing way to UNDSS and the drivers' room

B.6. SIDES OF THE BUILDING:

ABC street side/UNCDF: A structure was built between the building external wall and the perimeter wall. A cement roof was constructed and overlaid with brick tiles. This structure is along the ABC street side of the building wall and accommodates four UNCDF staff: two international and two local. Fig. 13 and 14 below explain the above.



FIG.13 –UNCDF office sunk under the garden and the street levels




FIG.14 – A Top View of UNCDF

DEF street side/ UNDSS and Drivers' Room: UNDSS is located on the DEF side of the basement. Entrance can be achieved from outside the premises as shown in fig. 12 &15 or from inside the

building. The drivers' room was erected separately and external to the building. It is built wall to wall with the DEF street perimeter wall (fig.16) and the perimeter fence of the XYZ Ambassador's Residence. The standoff on the DEF street side is 4m.




FIG.15 – DEF St. Side of the Building




FIG.16 –Same Side as Fig.15 showing Entrance to UNDSS and Drivers' Room

B.7. REAR OF THE BUILDING/CAR PARKING:

The car park area is located in the rear of the building. Accessed from GHI Street, it can accommodate up to 8 vehicles. Standoff on this side ranges from 3m to 6m. The perimeter wall on this side is approximately 3m high.




FIG.17 –Rear Parking area



FIG.18 –Rear Parking area




FIG.19- Parking Gate from inside

B.8. THE SHELTER/TUNNEL:

At the far edge of the front garden and behind the front reception area (see fig.11) a door leads to a circular staircase that descends below street level. At the base of the staircase, there is a path that leads, in series, to two very small rooms. Immediately after, few steps ascend again to the street level. A brick wall was built at the top of these steps to block the exit from this tunnel or shelter. It is believed that this tunnel was built as a shelter with an external escape route.



FIG.19 –Shelter Entrance



FIG.20 –Circular Stairs



FIG.21- One of the Two Rooms



FIG.22- Dead End

B.9. THE ROOF:

The second floor is the roof level. Four rooms and service area has been built on this last floor of the building. The FAO Liaison Office has taken an office room there. The exposed roof is a clear area with satellite dishes and an old communications mast.



FIG.23 – The Roof Area




FIG.24 – Ambassador's Residence- View from the Roof

B.10. THE BASEMENT:

The basement houses:

1. UNDSS with two rooms rented that have access from inside the building and also from the ABC side.
2. Crisis Coordination Center CCC (still unfinished & unequipped): A meeting room with an adjacent room in the basement was identified by the SA and the DOai/RRa.i. as the CCC. This has been approved by the SMT. Funds have started arriving from the Agencies to equip the CCC and make it operational. At its present state, this area is partly used for storage of second hand furniture. UNDP has started clearing this area. This process needs to be expedited and be given priority due to its importance to MOSS and to the UN operation.

3. Archive room for UNDP: This room contains old documents, printed material and equipment. It is in need of organizing, cleaning and of an adequate automatic fire suppression system. Independent ceiling-hung powder bottles with heat sensors/valves would suffice. UNDP needs to filter through this room and throw out the un-needed material to reduce the fire risk.
4. IT Server Room: recently identified and equipped as the server room, this room has the terminal for the CCTV system and its recording.

B.11. OFFICE OF THE DO/RC/RR:

This office is located on the first floor at the south-eastern corner of the first floor by DEF street. This means it has a standoff of $4+1.5=5.5$ meters from the street plus the added elevation.




FIG.25 – Building layout showing RC/DO office on 1st floor

B.12. FIRE SAFETY:

- a. Fire Plan/Building Evacuation/Bomb Threat Plan: None of these plans have been written. Building evacuation exercises are yet to start.
- b. Fire Alarm: An addressable fire detection/alarm system exists; however, it does not cover the entire building, especially the fire prone basement. UNDP has already been in contact with the supplier who has visited the building late in 2009 for technical assessment. Nothing developed after this visit.
- c. Fire Extinguishers: the building is inadequately equipped with fire extinguishers. The existing extinguishers are old and have not been maintained, as far as UNDP official remembers. A formal request has been placed to re-equip the building with adequate fire extinguishers. As it appears, UNDP management is active in this regard but nothing has materialized thus far.
- d. Fire exits and Signage: There are three ways to exit the building: the main front entrance, the rear exit towards the car park and the basement exit through UNDSS two offices. At the very least, the two front and rear parking exit doors should be opened/unlocked during office hours. Fire exit emergency lights have been purchased by UNDP but not yet installed.
- e. Staff Training: Responsible staff (wardens, security guards, fire marshals and drivers) in the building needs to be trained on administration of first aid, use of fire extinguishers, and drivers need additional defensive driving training to enhance their driving safety skills.
- f. First Aid Kit: The first aid kit in the old IT room in the building need to be increased by one. Two first aid kits need to be available on the site, adequately stocked.

B.13. CCTV:

UNDP has installed a new Samsung high resolution digital color CCTV system with multiplexing and recording capability: Currently, there are X installed internal and external cameras distributed to cover

the following:

- X internal cameras to cover the main entrance lobby and the rear emergency exit.
- X external cameras to cover the front garden.
- X external cameras to cover the clearance between the building and MNO st. perimeter wall.
- X external cameras to cover the rear of the building including the parking area.
- X external camera to cover the clearance where FAO roof situated.
- X external cameras fitted externally on the perimeter wall on ABC st.
- X external cameras fitted externally on the perimeter wall on DEF st.
- X external cameras to cover the front of the main entrance on GHI st.

The CCTV system still needs improvement in multiplex display switching and recording capability. The multiplex improvement could be done in software expansion but the recording capability from 4 days to the recommended 30 days needs a bigger hard disk than the installed 1 Terabite.



FIG.26 – Typical installation of CCTV external camera



FIG.27 – Multiplex View in the IT room and also in the Receptionist room

B.14. POWER GENERATION:

A diesel power generator of 50 KVA is installed in a special room by the perimeter wall on the GHI street side. It is situated immediately by the side gate. It is sufficient to feed power to building lights, computer/IT/communications equipment and 50% of air conditioning power. Fuel is on-site to last for one day. Reserve fuel is not stored on site but plans are in place to achieve this.

B.15. LIGHTING:

Internal lighting is adequate. Emergency exit lights have been purchased by UNDP but not yet installed. In case of a blackout, emergency lighting depends on the successful operation of the power generator. External perimeter lighting, especially towards the streets is in need of improvement. At night, it is difficult to see around the perimeter wall.

B.16. SECURITY/GUARD FORCE/RECEPTION/ACCESS CONTROL MEASURES:

- a. Government Security: The General Public Security office has detached xxx police constables to the UN House. They are being provided with a room immediately outside the main front gate. At any given time, there is one armed constable on duty outside the main gate. This policeman does not perform access control, visitors' physical screening or goods/bags inspection. He is only present for external protection and intervention when a threat is detected outside the premises (fig.29).



FIG.28 – The Reception Room



FIG.29 – Receptionist window shown by the Police Guard

- b. Receptionist/Telephone Operator (fig.28): the receptionist is hired by UNDP with a security element in his TOR. The telephone switchboard is located on the receptionist's desk. The receptionist also performs the duty of the telephone operator (seen in fig.28 above)
- c. Security Guards: UNDP hires guards, through a contracting service provider, to work outside working hours. One person is available every day outside working hours and also on weekends and public holidays. The guards attend to the telephone switchboard outside working hours. The guards only speak the local language.
- d. Access Control Measures: Visitors access control procedures are seldom adhered to. The window in the reception room (fig.29), made especially for communications between the visitors and the receptionist, is rarely used. The interphone fitted for the same purpose by the window is also not utilized the way it should. When appearing on the CCTV monitor, the visitor is allowed accessed into the reception area. As previously mentioned, the walk-through metal detector is rarely utilized and bags are rarely searched.

B.17. OTHER POINTS:

- a. All windows at the UN House are fitted with Shatter Resistant Film.
 - b. The front main wooden door of the building does not lock properly. A stronger more sophisticated lock is needed on that door.
 - c. UNIDO is said to be relocating to a government building adjacent to XYZ hotel near UNDP.
- Not all office rooms at UNDP can be locked and not all staff members have keys to their rooms. There is no key control procedure.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result to this survey, the following are the recommendations of the Security Advisor to cover the recognized deficiencies and to bring up the UN House to an acceptable level of emergency preparedness:

C.1. FIRE SAFETY:

Fire Extinguishers: On urgent basis, the building is in need to be refurbished with the following:

- a. Four x 6kg powder extinguishers on the ground floor and two x6Kg CO2 extinguishers.
- b. Same as above for the first floor.
- c. Four x 10kg automatic powder extinguisher, ceiling suspended in the archive room (see photo below) in the basement.
- d. Two x 6kg powder fire and one x6kg CO2 fire extinguisher in the rest of the basement.
- e. FAO, UNCDF and UNDSS should have each one x6kg powder and one x6kg CO2 extinguishers.
- f. One x6kg powder extinguishers and one x6Kg CO2 extinguisher in the front reception area.
- g. One x20kg Foam extinguisher (Trolley type) for the parking area (photo below)



Hanging Auto Powder Fire Extinguisher



Foam Trolley Extinguisher



Break Glass Fire Alarm Button

Fire Alarm: The fire alarm system needs to be expanded and complete to include all the rooms in the UN House. The alarm system needs to have break-glass alarm button on each entry/exit point, on each floor exit point such as staircase and also in the guard/reception room (photo displayed above).

First Aid Kit: One first aid kit is located on the first floor. One additional large first aid kit is needed, preferable a portable type.


Fire Plan/Building Evacuation/Bomb Threat Plan/Mass Casualties Plan: The Security Plan „Annex W”, “Annex Y” (Chapter 3 &4) and “Annex M section 3” provide a good reference and a generic plan to use by the agencies. The capability of making these generic references specific for the agency or for the building is simple. Once the plans are written, they should be exercised once each six months.

- a. **Staff Training:** Of course, training is recommended to all staff members. However, at the very minimum, the following training should be provided to the following categories of staff:
- b. **Fire fighting/use of fire extinguishers:** Should be provided to fire marshals, wardens, security staff and drivers.
- c. **Administration of First Aid:** should be provided to fire marshals, wardens, security staff and drivers.
- d. **Defensive Driving:** Should be given to drivers for free and for staff at large at cost-recovery basis.

C.2. ACCESS CONTROL/RECEPTION ROOM/GUARD FORCE:

Access Control of Visitors: Non-UN staff should not be allowed inside the front gate without having the purpose of their visit checked first by the receptionist. All verbal communications with the visitor should be done while he/she is outside the premises □ main gate: either through the window or through the interphone. Once inside the front gate, a dedicated access control security guard should clear the visitor, physically check bags and request the visitor to walk-through the metal detector for further checking

Reception Area/Room: This area needs expansion and re-design. After allowing the visitor inside the main gate, he/she should undergo security checks, for bags and body, by a UN-contracted security guard. After this, the visitor proceeds to the receptionist for registration and issue of visitor's ID card. Then, the receptionist opens (electronically) the inner reception door to allow the visitor inside the premises after the arrival of the escort staff members. All visitors must be escorted into the premises. The diagram to the right should give a fair indication to the needed procedure in the reception area.



X-Ray Machine: Since this is the UN House, it is recommended that a small baggage X-Ray unit be installed in the reception area. This X-Ray machine can also be utilized to screen and clear all mail and pouch deliveries.

Guard Force: It is recommended that UNDP hires professional security guards to staff the security station at the reception area. Professional guards are also needed to protect the inside perimeter outside working hours. The SA has cleared a private contracting company that provides professional and trained security guards. This company has the capability to act as the UN Guard Force provider. The contact details of that company have already been provided.

ID Cards: UN staff members must display their UN ID cards to the security guard to obtain access to the premises. They should continue displaying this card while on premises. Visitors' ID cards should be done and issued. Visitors should be instructed to keep their issued ID cards displayed throughout their visit.

C.3. LIGHTING & PERIMETER CLEARANCE:

Internal Lighting: The purchased emergency exit lights that were purchased by UNDP need to be installed. Additional battery-backed emergency lights need to be installed, at least in the corridors and stairwells.

External Lighting-on premises: Inside the perimeter wall, external lighting needs to be increased especially at the rear and both sides of the building. Overhanging trees need to be trimmed and pulled back to the

fence line at the rear and the side by ABC street near UNDSS area.

External Perimeter/side-walk lighting: At night, visibility outside the perimeter wall is virtually non-existent. The trees growing on the sidewalk prohibit the already scarce street lights from shining on the perimeter wall. This is a dangerous situation for the night guard and the police deployed to protect the external perimeter as approach to perimeter wall is very dark and detection of any climbers, per example, is difficult. It is recommended that perimeter wall lights be installed and the trees to be trimmed back about one meter from the fence line. We recommend that barbed wire be installed at the top of the metal bars above the brick perimeter wall.

C.4. CCTV

The following are recommended:

- a. Monitoring at present is only accomplished inside the IT room and in the reception area. Both areas do not provide sufficient monitoring of the existing cameras. It is recommended that an additional monitor be placed to be viewed and controlled by a responsible UNDP person.
- b. The switching between the 16 multiplexed viewing can only be achieved manually at present. It is recommended that the necessary software/hardware be procured to enable automatic switching between the two multiplexed views.
- c. More cameras are needed to be added to the system: One to cover the roof and roof door; one to cover the staircase accessing the roof; two cameras to be installed on the ground floor and two on the first floor to cover corridor areas.
- d. Currently, storage of recorded archive is insufficient. Only 1 Terabite of storage is available to give 4 days of recording. This needs to be increased to Four Terabite of hard disc storage to enable archiving for 30 days.

C.5. PARKING

Although not sufficient to cope with the UN capacity, parking by the perimeter wall is reserved for UN official and staff private vehicles. Since the UN has no compulsion mechanism to stop infringement to this arrangement, government interference is needed. UNDP should approach the Municipality to: 1) increase the parking spaces reserved outside for the United Nations, and, 2) to instruct the traffic police in the square outside UN House to enforce the parking arrangement outside the UN House.

C.6. KEY CONTROL

UNDP should adopt a Key Control procedure where all UNDP office keys are kept by a responsible person in a key cabinet. All office rooms and other rooms inside the building should have workable locks. Each staff member should take delivery of his/her office key and sign for its delivery on a specially designed form that is kept by the Key Master. A key registration log should be established for this procedure.

C.7. TUNNEL-SHELTER

UNDP should keep the underground tunnel-passage-shelter, which can be accessed from the

garden, clear and clean for emergency use. Normal lighting and emergency lighting should be provided to this shelter. UNDP should also look at the possibility of opening the originally designed exit door and see how best it can be utilized.

C.8. PORTABLE PHONE AT THE RECEPTION AREA

Since it is difficult for the receptionist/guard to hear the phone ring when outside the reception area, a portable phone should be installed in the reception room. Guards should be instructed not to leave their post without taking the portable phone with them. This is important for after hours communications with UNDP and UN House, especially in case of emergency

D. SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT

The UN House has the relatively largest gathering of UN staff members in Duty Station X. There are x to x international staff members at best of times and about xxx local staff members working in the building. The Security Phase XXX in Country X is mainly due to the regional threat of terrorism. In a precautionary state against terrorism, concerns are mainly from the following forms of attacks: 1) vehicle bombing (VBIED), and 2) personal suicide bombing (PBIED). Terrorists change their tactics to counteract measures deployed by their targets for protection. In the 2009 PBIED Islamabad-Pakistan attack on WFP, the terrorist disguised himself as a government security person and detonated his body-borne explosives while inside the premises. This tactic was used to evade the physical security measures taken outside WFP. In the attack against the US Embassy in Yemen in 2008, one of the terrorist plans was to enter and spray all the bombing survivors with bullets as they exit the bombed building. However, in Duty Station X there is no history of terrorist attacks and law and order appear to be in strong grip of the authorities. The XXXX Group has entered dialogue with the Government and as a consequence hundreds of members have been released from prison. Although a final agreement has not been reached but the XXXX Group has not posed a threat against the UN, the Government assured us that it is aware of their presence and keeping them under surveillance. The other Islamic extremist party, XXXXX, has not engaged in militancy and does not have a significant violent history. Furthermore, there has been no visible or direct terrorist threat detected in Duty Station X, or even the rest of Country X, against the United Nations.

Taking the above into account under the current UN SRA, the UN House, in its current state plus the implementation of the above recommendations, is acceptable for the operations of the resident agencies. With the current conditions, especially with the current access control measures and fire risks, UN House management must start taking strong action to cover all the existing deficiencies and enforce the UN security and safety culture among the resident staff members. Security and Safety awareness training is a good remedy for this problem that DSS can and will be engaged in.

Due to the regional threat of terrorism and to the current preparedness status of UN House (as mentioned in this report), the security risk level for terrorism (VBIED and PBIED) is assessed at the Medium level. If in case the local UN threat assessment for terrorism increases, measures need to be taken to meet the development of this threat. Due to the inadequate street standoff from two sides of

the building and the busy location at a city crossroads, one of these measures could be to relocate UN House to a safer location in Duty Station X.

Currently, the highest threat to the UN House is fire. The building has an assessed risk level of Medium to High. This is due to: 1) shortage of or absence of working fire extinguishers, 2) fire_risk in the basement, 3) incomplete fire alarm, 4) lack of fire safety plan and mass casualties plan, 5) lack of building evacuation plan and drills, 6) lack of first aid training, and, 7) lack of fire fighting training. Urgent steps are needed to rectify these deficiencies.

End of Report

Prepared by: XXXXXX, SA, UNDSS-Country X

Date: